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The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: 
Decoupling the Self from 
the Personal Level∗ 
Robert D. Rupert 
University of Colorado, Boulder 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the nature of the self, in particular, what the 
self appears to be in the age of cognitive science. It does so through 
the lens of a commonly made distinction between the personal and 
the subpersonal levels of reality; for, given the supposed nature of 
the personal level, the personal level would seem the most likely 
home for the human self. Much of the discussion to follow takes a 
negative tone. I argue that, when one adopts the perspective of 
contemporary cognitive science, the personal level fades from 
view, and thus that we shall not find the self there; for there appears 
to be no such level. This negative tack produces positive results, 
however, by yielding a more accurate picture of the structure of 
cognitive science. Moreover, attention to the structure of working 
cognitive science promises to deliver insights into the nature of a 
human self as it is likely to appear from the perspective of 
contemporary cognitive science. 
The paper proceeds as follows. After articulating the personal-
subpersonal distinction, I lay out what I’ll call the ‘Received View’ 
of the relation between the personal level and cognitive science. 
According to this view, the personal level is populated by process-
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es, states, and properties about which much is known independent-
ly of science; for its part, cognitive science investigates the mech-
anistic, or more broadly physical, basis of such processes, states, 
and properties, which basis appears at the subpersonal level. The 
Received View places the self in a realm distinct from the processes 
and states investigated by cognitive science and assigns philosoph-
ers a distinctive role, as explorers of that distinct realm, by dint of 
their facility with a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, and intro-
spection. Cognitive science retains a modest role, determined for it 
from outside of cognitive science itself: studying how the physical 
organism implements, grounds, or enables the appearance of the 
personal-level facts, themselves known nonscientifically.  
I argue that this picture radically misrepresents the structure of 
cognitive science. As an experimental science, its job is, first and 
foremost, to model publicly observable, replicable data. (And to 
the extent that cognitive science is a field science, its job is to model 
data collected according to the standards operative in the collection 
of data pertaining to, e.g., historical geological processes or to the 
spread of diseases through populations.) Examination of the 
working science itself seems to reveal no evidence of a personal 
level, and certainly not one the accounting for which provides the 
primary goal of, and a significant constraint on, cognitive science. 
Nowhere in the literature have I found a case in which working 
cognitive scientists rejected an otherwise superior model of extant 
data in favor of an otherwise inferior model of that same data 
because the latter model, but not the former, fit with a prioristic or 
otherwise armchair-generated claims about a supposed personal 
level. To the extent that cognitive science vindicates (or will, in the 
future, vindicate) commitments of a prioristic or common sense 
based reflection, it does so (or will do so) on its own terms, only 
where the entities, states, or distinctions in question appear in a 
significant range of cognitive science’s best models of the relevant 
data, where, by ‘best’, I mean those that rise to the top given normal 
scientific standards having nothing to do with facts about a sup-
posed personal level. I support this alternative view with two case 
studies.  
It follows, then, that the relationship between cognitive science 
and the self is not what the Received View would suggest. It is not 
the case that cognitive science yields an account of the self by suc-
ceeding in its task of vindicating a priori (or introspection-based, or 
common sense based) commitments made independently of the 
science and meant to set the standard for success in cognitive sci-
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ence’s investigation of the self or person. Rather, if cognitive 
science yields an account of the self at all, it does so (or will do so) 
by generating models that contain self-like constructs in them, that 
is, constructs that have properties or play roles sufficiently like the 
pretheoretic concept of the self as to warrant the application of that 
term. In closing, I speculate about the likely nature of such con-
structs. 
2. The Personal and Subpersonal Levels 
What, then, is the personal level supposed to be? The literature 
contains a variety of characterizations, and I shall not attempt to 
formulate a single, definitive picture or a set of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions. Rather, in what follows, I content myself with a 
listing of properties typically associated with the personal level and 
some scattered remarks on potential connections between various 
of these properties. 
Some authors identify the personal level with the realm of enti-
ties picked out by literal use of personal pronouns. They tend to 
write such things as, “My visual cortex doesn’t see the tree. I see 
the tree,” to indicate their conviction that perceiving is a state of a 
whole person (see, for example, McDowell 1994). (And sometimes 
such remarks seem to amount to little more than what I have in the 
past labeled the ‘argument from the italicized pronoun’.) Impor-
tantly, though, such authors do not mean to claim something only 
about parts and wholes of organisms—that, for instance, because 
the whole organism has a property not shared with some of its 
parts, a distinct level of reality thereby exists. After all, a human’s 
arm has a length but no height (and her body has height but no 
length). The fact that the whole body has a property not had by 
one of its parts (and vice versa) hardly entails the existence of a new 
level of reality. What might be added, then, to create an additional 
level of reality? 
More often than not, consciousness serves as the additional 
ingredient. Humans are consciously aware of their thoughts, feel-
ings, and sensory experiences, and such states seem central to who 
we are, central to our conception of ourselves as persons. More-
over, consciousness is often thought to carry with it special epis-
temeic status, providing specially secure knowledge available only 
from the first-person perspective. The individual is immediately 
acquainted with his or her own conscious experiences, in a way that 
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no one else can be. The sheer uniqueness of this phenomenon sug-
gests that conscious states have a distinctive ontological status. 
Personal-level states are also thought to have a distinctive sort 
of content (McDowell 1994). The special nature of this content 
might consist in (a) its being propositional, (b) its being consciously 
accessible, or (c) its being built into conscious states themselves. 
Whereas subpersonal states function as mere detectors or causal 
mediators—like dummy lights on an automobile’s dashboard—
personal-level states such as beliefs can genuinely represent—and 
misrepresent—the world as being a certain way and can be offered 
by the subject as reasons in support of her beliefs (Brandom 1998). 
Humans appear to act for reasons—that is, on the basis of what 
they think, believe, know, and desire—and it has been widely sug-
gested that this form of reasons-based agency is distinctive of the 
personal level. Everyday explanatory practice—the workings of so-
called folk psychology—reflects this fact. Folk psychology rep-
resents subjects’ behavior as a product of their beliefs and desires, 
and the intentions formed on the basis of them. Why did Sarah go 
to the kitchen? Because she wanted a sandwich, and she believed 
that sandwich-makings awaited in the kitchen.  
This way of understanding the personal level (and the persons 
who populate it) dovetails with another important strand of think-
ing about the personal level: that it is the realm in which one finds 
the kinds of states appealed to by the folk—beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, in particular.1  
Rational coherence is often associated with the personal level. 
Although the human subconscious may be fragmented—filled 
with conflicting urges, fears, and inclinations—the entities populat-
ing the personal level are thought to maintain a certain consistency 
and to operate in accordance with certain logical rules (Colombo 
2013, 549). At the personal level, one’s psyche hangs together, it is 
thought, with no contradictory beliefs and no sets of intransitive 
preferences; if errors of rationality do appear at the personal level, 
1 As Rey (2001) sees things, once one recognizes the full range of states invoked 
by everyday psychological explanation—hopes, dreams, fears, states of surprise, 
convictions, annoyances, joy, grief, anger, excitement—the placement of folk 
psychological states at the personal level, as a domain distinct from the level 
investigated by workaday cognitive science and distinguished particularly by its 
being the home of belief-desire explanation—loses its plausibility. Here Rey 
builds on the insights of Hursthouse (1991) in which she employs the notion of 
an arational action. More generally, Rey (2001) constitutes a pointed and cogent 
critique of received views of the importance of the personal-subpersonal 
distinction. 
 
 
                                                 
4
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 47 [], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol47/iss1/2
5 
the person (or subject, or self) is held responsible for them and is 
obligated to reinstate rational coherence. 
In contrast to the natural world, the personal level provides the 
home for normative properties. The personal level is the distinctive 
realm of obligation, oughts, and shoulds. Accordingly, it is the 
realm of responsibility for one’s choices and one’s actions. The 
subject’s reasoned deliberation causes her actions, and in the wake 
of such action, praise and blame are appropriate; someone who 
chooses to divert his or her employer’s funds to a private bank 
account has made a poor decision and can rightly be blamed for it. 
Consider the contrasting situation in the natural world. It is the 
realm of blind mechanism, deterministic forces, and natural laws. 
There is no ought or should in the natural world; there are simply 
the facts about what happens. Let’s say, as Newton thought, that 
the force acting on a body equals the body’s mass times its rate of 
acceleration. In that case, F = ma describes a widespread pattern 
of occurrences in nature, with no evaluative connotation. It is not 
as if nature should be that way or ought to be that way; it just is that 
way. 
The subpersonal level is, roughly speaking, the portion of the 
natural realm pertaining specifically to the processes that produce 
action or behavior. Often, when drawing the distinction between 
the personal and subpersonal levels, the latter is associated with 
neural activity. But, the more general idea is that the subpersonal 
level contains whatever forces or processes produce human behav-
ior by simple cause and effect, the kind of cause and effect associat-
ed with the natural sciences, where natural law and mere mech-
anism reign. This might be characterized as the engineering level 
(cf. Dennett 1987); persons, minds, consciousness, and selves 
appear at the personal level, while the subpersonal level houses the 
mechanical rigging, ropes, and wires—whatever makes possible, 
enables, accounts for, grounds, or implements the personal-level 
states and processes, whether it be computational processing of 
linguistic form or primary visual cortex’s detection of edges. 
3. Cognitive Science and the Personal-Subpersonal 
Distinction 
How are cognitive science and the personal and subpersonal levels 
related to each other? According to the Received View, personal-
level facts are identified independently of the scientific endeavor; 
they are known a priori, by introspection, by conceptual analysis, or 
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by common sense. Cognitive science then investigates the sub-
personal mechanisms or processes that make such personal pro-
cesses possible (or actual). On this view, cognitive science works in 
the service of a certain kind of philosophy—introspection, con-
ceptual analysis, and reflection on the deliverances of common 
sense. 
Consider examples of supposed personal-level phenomena: 
someone’s knowing English; someone’s being addicted to cocaine; 
someone’s being in pain; someone’s being able to reason well; 
someone’s being in love with someone else; someone’s being a 
skilled chess player; and someone’s visually perceiving the layout of 
his or her immediate physical environment. These are, it is thought, 
states or capacities of the entire person. You, as an entire human 
being or person, can, for example, navigate a room visually. Cog-
nitive science is responsible for explaining how stimulation of your 
retinal cells by photons gets processed in successive stages, from 
activity in bipolar cells, on through the lateral geniculate nucleus, 
to occipital cortex, and so on, resulting in, or otherwise facilitating, 
a person’s having a perceptual experience that can guide her 
smoothly across the room. 
The Received View prevails among a large number of influ-
ential philosophers of mind—including John McDowell (1994), 
Tyler Burge (2010), Susan Hurley (1998), Mark Rowlands (1997), 
Jennifer Hornsby (2000), Martin Davies (2000a, 2000b), Jose Luis 
Bermúdez (2000), and Nicholas Shea (2013), among many others. 
They take non-experimentally produced personal-level phenomena 
as the (primary) explananda of cognitive science or to constrain 
cognitive scientific modeling (model choice, in particular) and 
theory construction in some other significant way. To be clear, 
various among these authors allow more or less revision of a priori 
or commonsense commitments regarding personal-level phenom-
ena. Some significant constraint from the personal level remains in 
place, however, even on this weaker view; for even if character-
izations of supposed personal-level phenomena are allowed to be 
defeasible, they provide a presumptive constraint on cognitive-
scientific modeling and theorizing, in the way explananda do; they 
provide targets of explanation and therefore put regulative or 
evaluative pressure on cognitive science, in the way that one would 
think only data or patterns in data would. And, of paramount 
importance, they are thought to do so without actually being data 
of the standard sort that ground experimental sciences, that is, 
measurable, replicable results. Cognitive science is, on this view, 
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engaged only (or primarily) in ‘vertical explanation’ (Drayson 2012; 
cf. Bermúdez 2000, Colombo 2013, Cummins 1983), at least to the 
extent that cognitive science appeals to the subpersonal in formula-
ting explanations; cognitive science does its proper job when it 
takes an independently established mental state, ability, or capacity 
as target and investigates the mechanical, computational, or neural 
processes that enable (McDowell 1994) that personal-level state, 
ability, or capacity. 
A philosopher of science should suspect that something has 
gone wrong with this interpretation of cognitive science; for, in no 
other science do pre-theoretical intuitions about phenomena con-
strain science in the way that a priori claims about the personal level 
are thought by many philosophers of mind to constrain cognitive 
science. This is not to say that intuition or guesswork play no role 
in structuring a science. Sciences begin with hunches about what 
sort of observations are of a piece with each other, that is, what 
sorts of observable phenomena fall in that science’s distinctive 
domain. But, these amount to hunches about what range of data 
will be accounted for by similar models, which hunches are hostage 
primarily to the further collection of, and modeling of, data. It’s 
not a matter of there being higher-level phenomenon about which 
commonsense facts must be respected when science does its work. 
Our best evidence that two systems are both harmonic oscillators 
requires that our best models of the behavior of those systems 
share a deep theoretical unity (e.g., equations used to model them 
have the same basic form). Physics models the behavior of the 
systems, and the lessons about those systems—whether they’re of 
the same kind and so on—emerge from an interpretation of those 
models; it’s not a matter of being committed to the construction of 
a model of the implementation, ground, or enabling conditions of 
some higher-level phenomenon—the property of being an oscillat-
or—as it is conceived of by the folk or characterized by conceptual 
analysis. 
To give the reader a taste of the Received View, and its short-
comings, consider the following passage from Tyler Burge’s The 
Origins of Objectivity: 
The science of perceptual psychology is motivated 
by the goal of contributing to an explanation of 
how individuals perceive. More particularly, vision 
science assumes that individuals have approximate-
ly accurate visual perception some of the time. And 
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it tries to contribute to an explanation of how such 
perception comes about to the extent that it does. 
(Burge 2010, pp. 87–88) 
This should strike philosophers of science and cognitive scientists 
as strange. Vision science is out to develop the best models of the 
most judiciously collected, replicable data—for instance, of verbal 
reports of the shape or orientation of stimulus items. Of course, 
any philosopher of cognitive science or cognitive scientist worth 
their salt should want to identify theoretically interesting patterns 
in such models. And, at any given time, these more theory-oriented 
efforts at generalization over models might paint a picture of vision 
according to which most percepts are approximately accurate; but 
such efforts might not, depending on the state of the science at that 
time. It is likely that, in the end (if ever there be one), the correct 
answer will have emerged from our best models of vast amounts 
of data; but a legitimate science does not take such answers as given 
prior to enquiry. Everyday ideas concerning the mind are likely to 
influence and inspire experimental design in cognitive science, but 
that’s quite different from establishing the goals—the very stan-
dards of success—for cognitive science. 
More to the present point, there’s no reason to think that vision 
scientists are committed to personal-level states (note that, on 
Burge’s preferred usage, ‘individual level’ plays the role of ‘personal 
level’). Vision scientists do indeed care about the number of sub-
jects involved in an experiment, in the standard parlance of meth-
odology sections (“there were n subjects...”), and the reidenti-
fication of those subjects over time; but this practice carries no 
metaphysical commitment beyond what’s necessary to index any 
particular piece of data to the organism that produced it. Such 
indexing is a matter of tracking the performance of a particular 
organism over time; it does not presuppose the existence of a 
higher level of reality or distinctive domain of personal-level prop-
erties. 
Burge goes on to assert an even more striking form of philoso-
phical priority in cognitive science: 
But, necessarily and constitutively, individuals 
perceive. Perceptual states, as distinct from trans-
formations by which they are formed, are the 
individual’s. Individuals perceive as a result of per-
ceptual states’ being formed in their perceptual sys-
 
 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 47 [], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol47/iss1/2
9 
tems. Perceptual states are realizations of individ-
uals’ capacities. I think that this claim is a priori. 
(Ibid., p. 369) 
According to Burge, there’s an entity, the individual, and, when 
visual perception occurs, that individual is in the state, or has the 
property, of perceiving; this is “necessarily” and “constitutively” 
true. Moreover, Burge claims to know this a priori, that is, that his 
belief is justified independent of empirical investigation. The 
strength of such claims is, however, deeply puzzling: perhaps 
perceiving a scene is a state of the individual; but perhaps it isn’t.2 
The proof is in the pudding, and thus the pudding has to be made 
and inspected before one attempts to assemble such proof. 
Of course, a philosopher who does not intend to integrate his 
or her philosophy of mind with contemporary scientific findings 
and who does not claim to draw any support for his or her views 
from the cognitive sciences might feel free to make pronounce-
ments about the matter in whatever way he or she likes. Burge, 
however, is no such philosopher. His writings on vision are empir-
ically sophisticated. He has clearly mastered a wide swath of vision 
science and intends to take it seriously. In the work quoted above, 
he surveys a wealth of results from vision science. Why, then, the 
insensitivity to the structure of scientific enquiry? Why the pro-
clamation of a priori knowledge about personal- or individual-level 
facts—knowledge of facts that set the very standard of success for 
vision science? Why not argue, instead, that our best cognitive sci-
ence makes positive use of the concept of an individual or personal 
level, acknowledging that it just as well might not have and that 
cognitive science might take a different turn in the future? 
2 One might stipulate that ‘percept’ can be applied only to states of the entire 
individual, but doing so would simply move the bump in the rug. Such 
stipulation introduces the possibility that humans do not ever perceive but in-
stead have processes very much like perception, though these processes must be 
called by a different name (‘schmerception’ or ‘perception*’ or what have you), 
because they’re not in any deep or distinctive way states of the individual. Bear 
in mind that, from a grammatical standpoint, states of individuals are easy to 
come by. Consider an organism in which bipolar cells are firing. One can de-
scribe that situation by saying, for example, “The bipolar cells in Joe’s visual sys-
tem are firing,” which has the grammatical form of an attribution of a property 
to a subpersonal mechanism in Joe. But, one could just as well describe the situa-
tion as “Joe’s being in the state of having his bipolar cells firing,” which has the 
grammatical form of an attribution of a property (via the attribution of a state) 
to Joe as a whole. Thus, grammar alone is no guide to the metaphysics of levels 
in such cases. 
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Burge is no outlier here, at least not with respect to the general 
picture of the relation between cognitive science and philosophy of 
mind. In a relatively recent book chapter, Nicholas Shea runs 
through the details of some leading neural models of decision-
making. And, summarizing the role of the experiments vis-a-vis the 
personal and subpersonal levels, he says: 
But it is unsatisfactory to assimilate the whole 
pattern of behavior to the subpersonal level. The 
subjects are fully conscious normal adults, behav-
ing as they do in the experiment because they have 
understood and are following instructions... Sub-
jects are motivated by the cash rewards available in 
the experiment and their behaviour shows sensi-
tivity to the structure of those rewards. It is hard to 
deny that they are acting voluntarily when they 
select one stimulus over another....the thing to be 
explained—the subject’s behaviour—is a voluntary 
action at the personal level. So the temporal differ-
ence model...provides a putative subpersonal level 
information-processing explanation of a personal 
level phenomenon. (Shea 2013, 1074) 
As Shea sees things, cognitive science is “uncovering the constit-
utive basis of personal-level phenomena like believing, desiring, 
and perceiving” (ibid., 1068). Thus, the Received View is, I submit, 
standard fare in philosophy of mind, among empirically sophistic-
ated philosophers of mind, no less. Known facts at the personal 
level are treated as the phenomena, and cognitive science provides 
an explanation of them by identifying their subpersonal basis. 
I contend that such authors as Burge and Shea present an 
erroneous picture of cognitive science, regardless of whether their 
marking of a personal-subpersonal distinction is useful for purpos-
es unrelated to the understanding of cognitive science. Moreover, 
to the extent that they present a misguided philosophy of cognitive 
science, it is also a misguided naturalistic philosophy of mind. If 
one would like to understand the self in the age of cognitive sci-
ence, the Received View threatens to mislead us, by promoting a 
view of cognitive science according to which the identification of 
the self is independent of the nitty-gritty work of the science itself. 
In contrast to the Received View, consider the perspective of 
two of the founding figures of cognitive science, Alan Newell and 
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Herbert Simon, in the first major presentation of their ground-
breaking research program. They say, “What questions should a 
theory of problem solving answer? First, it should predict the 
performance of a problem solver handling specified tasks” 
(Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958, 151). On this view, personal-level 
capacities or abilities are not the constraining explananda of 
cognitive science. Rather the goal is to model observable, 
measurable data. (This is to be expected; cognitive science was 
meant to be a science after all.) And, the essential goal has remained 
the same over the decades of development in cognitive science: to 
model human performance (or the measurable aspects of the 
performance of nonhuman subjects). Here we have two modern 
giants in cognitive neuroscience, Larry Squire and Eric Kandel, 
describing the cognitive science of memory: “Memory promises to 
be the first mental faculty to be understandable in a language that 
makes a bridge from molecules to mind, that is, from molecules to 
cells, to brain systems, and to behavior” (2000, 3). What is it, 
according to Squire and Kandel, to cross the bridge from molecules 
to mind? It is decidedly not the preservation of commitments to 
antecedently identified personal-level states. The goal is to model 
behavior of the relevant sort by appeal to the tools of natural 
science, from biology to systems-level analysis neural activity. 
This is not to say that our everyday conception of human 
capacities has no role to play in cognitive science. It has many roles; 
it inspires experimental design, for example, and provides useful 
language for summarizing patterns of results—in introduction and 
discussion sections of scientific publications as well as in science 
writing. This is par for the course in the history of science, having 
nothing particularly to do with psychology or cognitive science. In 
the initial stages of the investigation of some phenomena, research 
is guided by pre-theoretic observations, which inspire and structure 
the investigation. But, that is quite different from the case in which 
the pre-theoretic observations or intuitions provide a hard con-
straint on the interpretation of the science, as it matures, or in 
which they set the standard of success for the science in question. 
Pre-theoretic commitments to personal-level facts do not guide 
model selection in the substantive way required by the Received 
View; if the Received View were correct, then, in a situation in 
which an otherwise superior model fits poorly with the supposed 
personal-level facts than does an otherwise inferior model, 
cognitive scientists would reject the former in favor of the latter. 
But, so far as I can tell, this is not standard practice in cognitive 
 
 
11
Rupert: The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport,
12 
science. We should perform modus tollens, then, rejecting the 
Received View and sidelining the personal level in our interpreta-
tion of the structure of cognitive science. 
What, though, should we make of the use of ‘memory faculty’ 
in the passage quoted above from Squire and Kandel? The litera-
ture is rife with such uses: cognitive science is meant to account for 
such phenomena as the learning of spatial layouts, the acquisition 
of language, the ability to recognize faces, so on. Each of these 
cases might be understood as a case in which cognitive scientists 
want to account for personal-level phenomenon. But, the 
“accounting for” in question is too thin to offer solace to 
philosophical proponents of the Received View. The use of 
‘memory’ and ‘learning’ is not a reification of a personal level, 
beyond a bet that there is a relatively unified model of a range of 
behavior that we would normally refer to as ‘memory-related’;3 it 
does not express a commitment to knowledge acquired a priori (or 
by introspection, common sense, or conceptual analysis) of facts 
about that level, which then provide the explanatory targets, qua 
standards of success, for cognitive science. Rather, in these 
contexts, use of such talk serves as a tool for indicating patterns in 
the data or in the models of those data; or has an organizational 
aspect; or reflects pretheoretical guesses (encoded in everyday lang-
uage) regarding which behavioral data sets are likely to be such that 
the best models of them are unified (Rupert 2013, Colombo 2013). 
But, that’s a far cry from a situation in which accounting for some 
supposed personal-level facts provides the explanatory target of 
cognitive science, providing a desideratum that guides selection be-
tween competing models.4 
3 See Tulving (2000, 41) for doubts that memory is natural kind. I read these 
doubts in the following way. Cognitive scientists working on memory are willing 
to offer vertical explanations of system-level capacities, so long as those 
capacities, individually, amount to natural kinds, where our best evidence of such 
status is a certain unity to the modeling of the various data associated with that 
general capacity. Tulving sees significant diversity in the modeling of such data 
and thus resists the idea that there is a general, system-level capacity, memory, to 
be explained vertically. Note, however, that even in cases in which the system-
level capacity is accounted for vertically, commitment to its existence is a contin-
gent matter depending on the success and unity of certain modeling strategies; 
moreover, the establishing of such a system-level capacity does not establish the 
existence of a personal level of reality at which appear the distinctive properties 
that the Received View associates with the personal level. 
4 The comments in the main text might seem to presuppose too narrow a con-
cepttion of cognitive science, as being concerned only with models of the 
mechanisms that produce behavior (in the generic sense of ‘mechanism’). The 
reader might reasonably suspect, then, that this narrow conception of cognitive 
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As a further example, consider one of the most currently influ-
ential “top-down” research programs in cognitive science, Bayesian 
cognitive modeling. Among leading proponents of this view are 
Thomas Griffith and Joshua Tenenbaum. Their work shows less 
concern for mechanism than it does for highly abstracted, formal 
models, giving at least initial priority to the elements of the 
Bayesian frameworks: hypothesis evaluation and probabilistic 
inference. This might sound as if it shares the top-down perspec-
tive of the Received View. After all, it does seem natural to think 
of evaluating hypotheses and performing inferences as personal-
level matters. But, notice the way in which they and co-authors 
characterize such constructs: “Hypotheses can take any form...as 
long as they specify a probability distribution over observable data. 
Likewise, different inductive biases can be captured by assuming 
different prior distributions over hypotheses” (Griffiths et al. 2010, 
358). The sort of hypothesizing and probabilistic inference in 
question bears almost none of the supposed marks of the personal 
level. The hypotheses are not consciously entertained; the typical 
science stacks the deck against personal-level approaches. Two remarks in re-
sponse: First, an emphasis on the modeling of the mechanistic processes that 
produce behavioral data is what makes cognitive science a distinctive enterprise 
(differing in character from, say, the mere formal modeling of economic ration-
ality or the mere collection of data in behavioral psychology labs—not that such 
projects have no role in cognitive science; they inspire the search for computa-
tionally or neurally realistic mechanistic models). Second, and this is the deeper 
point, the integrative project gives cognitive science its distinctive appeal as the 
ultimate “science of the mind”; only a science that integrates its formal models 
with, and accounts for behavioral data by appeal to, biologically plausible mech-
anistic models, satisfies the fundamental scientific urge to understand how all of 
nature, including minds, hangs together. In other words, there are excellent 
reasons why cognitive science, as conceived of here, emerged and flourished. 
Early modelers saw the promise of accounting for the forms of behavior that 
seemed particularly intelligent (language use, theorem proving, etc.) within an 
integrated scientific conception of nature, by using models of internal mech-
anisms that allow for precise prediction of measurable behavior (Newell, Shaw, 
and Simon 1958, 152, 155–156; see also Simon and Newell’s more explicit, 
retrospective description [1971, 147–148] of what they were up to in their early 
work). This holds despite the fact that, early work in cognitive science tended to 
focus on information-processing models rather than on neural modeling. Early 
modelers were sanguine about the ultimate grounding of their proposals in the 
brain (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958, 163), partly because the place of 
computational processing in the physical realm was well-enough understood; 
computing machines could, after all, be built from physical parts performing 
operations that, demonstrably, human brains could perform (McCulloch and 
Pitts 1943). Thus, I do not rely on too narrow a vision of cognitive science; its 
attempt to model the mechanistic processes that produce measurable human 
behavior provided the impetus for its early development, and the extent of its 
success in this regard explains its rise to prominence and remains central to its 
status as the going science of the mind. 
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human cognizer is not specifying probability distributions over 
observable data. The inferences are not of the slow, deliberate kind. 
These constructs are far removed from the folk framework; neither 
Bayes’s Theorem nor the axioms of probability theory from which 
it can be derived are part of folk wisdom or folk psychology. The 
process of updating probability distributions in response to data 
during, say, language processing (or any of the other examples that 
Griffiths et al. discuss) is not available to introspection; it does not 
guide verbal report. There’s no reason to think the formation of 
hypotheses of this sort must be done by the whole person, as 
opposed to being done by components of her cognitive system. 
If the Bayesian approach overlaps with personal-level theoriz-
ing at all, it might be in the rational nature of probabilistic infer-
ence, which many proponents of personal-level theorizing might 
identify as normatively laden. Nevertheless, the sort of normativity 
in question—there being a correct way to derive posterior prob-
abilities from prior probabilities given some new data—hardly 
qualifies the top-down deployment of Bayesian models as a kind of 
personal-level modeling that friends of the Received View would 
embrace as their own. First, as noted above, the states and 
processes in question have very few, if any, of the commonly cited 
personal-level characteristics. Second, Griffiths et al. hope ulti-
mately to contribute to cognitive science’s search for models of 
human performance: “Although cognitive modeling and machine 
learning are two different enterprises, a basic challenge for both is 
to match human-level performance in domains such as language, 
vision, and reasoning” (ibid., 363). In keeping with the conception 
of cognitive science that I stress throughout, the goal of cognitive 
science—whether, methodologically speaking, its investigations 
proceed in a top-down or bottom-up fashion—is to model the data 
successfully, not to respect and vindicate prior commitments to 
claims about an ontologically distinctive personal level. Third, on 
the vision of Griffiths et al., Bayesian cognitive modelers match 
human performance by guiding the search for mechanisms that 
perform Bayesian inference “in a variety of implicit and approxi-
mate ways” (ibid., 362). More generally speaking, Griffiths et al. 
hope for a “synthesis with more bottom-up, mechanistically con-
strained approaches to modeling the mind” (ibid., 362). On this 
view, “Probabilistic models are a tool for exploring different sets 
of assumptions about representations and inductive biases, making 
it possible for data to lead us to an account of human cognition” 
(ibid., 363). Bayesian models do not reflect supposedly a priori truths 
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about a personal level, truths that then strongly constrain the selec-
tion of models in cognitive science (leading cognitive scientists to 
reject otherwise superior models of the data because they don’t 
portray human cognition as optimally Bayesian). Rather, the use of 
Bayesian principles helps us to formulate models of the actual hu-
man cognitive process and understand why that process might be 
useful to the organism, even if actual human cognition is not exact-
ly Bayesian. Fourth, and closely related to the preceding point, for 
Griffiths et al., the top-down approach is an empirical bet about 
methodology. They offer empirical arguments for their approach, 
for example, that top-down Bayesian cognitive modeling is more 
likely to explore the space of possibilities effectively, and less likely 
to get bogged down in dead-ends, than is a mechanisms-first 
approach (ibid., 358). Implicit in this style of argument is a 
commitment to contingency: if the competing mechanisms-first 
approach ultimately produces models that account for human 
behavior, while the top-down Bayesian approach flounders, 
Griffiths et al. will have lost their empirical bet. They do not take 
Bayesian principles to be “necessarily and constitutively” true of 
human cognition.  
I am not arguing for eliminativism about the kinds of states 
appealed to by commonsense psychology (cf. Churchland 1981). 
Absolutely not. Perhaps such states exist; and if they do exist, they 
might be much as the folk conceived of them; but, then, again, they 
might not be. I take no stand on any of these issues. Rather, my 
point is that, if cognitive science is to vindicate such things as 
beliefs, intentions, and conscious states, such states had better 
show up in the models of the relevant behavioral data or of other 
relevant sorts of third-person data, such as imaging data that is 
meant to help guide the modeling of behavioral data.  
And similar remarks apply to the distinction between a person-
al and a subpersonal level. Models in cognitive science incorporate 
whatever elements prove to be useful—place-indicating grids of 
hippocampal cells, decay-rate parameters for items in a visual 
buffer, arrays of on-center-off-surround cells, operations of cate-
gorization by a feature-matching algorithm, etc. Typically, how-
ever, these models account for the data directly; they do not run 
through personal-level constructs. Subjects (in the generic, organ-
ismic sense) exhibit patterns of responses. Cognitive scientists 
spend their time recording and modeling those responses, as well 
as collecting data on the neural processes involved, which will also 
be modeled as part of the data set that includes the record of the 
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behavior of interest that was exhibited while imaging was being 
done. Such modeling could, in principle, vindicate the distinction 
between the personal and subpersonal levels, but that would 
require qualitative differences to appear in a wide range of 
models—differences that do some causal or explanatory work in 
the models—such that those qualitative differences map reason-
ably well onto the distinction between the two families of prop-
erties of the sort discussed in section 2, above. At present, it is 
difficult to find such a distinction in extant cognitive-scientific 
models. 
Philosophers of mind seem to want to subvert or avoid this 
way of approaching cognitive science, by building the personal-
subpersonal distinction into the structure of cognitive science from 
the outset; that seems to be the point of setting up supposed 
personal-level facts as the anchor, constraint, and explananda of 
cognitive science. But, so far as I can tell, that is bad philosophy of 
science. It would seem to be a molding of the structure of cognitive 
science to fit one’s philosophical commitments arrived at by a dif-
ferent route. 
Of course, philosophers of mind interested in cognitive science 
might pursue other goals than to articulate the structure of cog-
nitive science. They might, for example, ask whether cognitive 
science, understood on its own terms, can inspire new uses of, or 
indirectly reveal new contours of, folk concepts, regardless of 
whether cognitive science vindicates the folk states or properties. 
A philosopher doing conceptual analysis might, by analogy, find 
that scientific results inspire the construction of a thought experi-
ment, for example. Or, working by analogy, a philosopher propos-
ing an account of, for instance, the self, belief, or weakness of will 
might pattern her account after some aspect of the structure of a 
cognitive-scientific model or family of models. But, it is absolutely 
essential not to conflate the fruitfulness of these relatively innocent 
ways of approaching cognitive science philosophically with support 
for the Received View. On the Received View, cognitive science 
answers questions about the self only by finding out how the self—
which we know to exist on the personal level and which does not 
necessarily reflect an aspect of cognitive-scientific modeling—is 
implemented at the subpersonal level. Thus, on the Received View, 
if one would like to know what cognitive science tells us about the 
nature of the self, the answer is essentially “nothing” (Hornsby 
2000); or, at the most, it might supplement or revise our personal-
level conception of the self (Davies 2000a, 2000b, Bermu ́dez 2000, 
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Colombo 2013). But, even the latter, weaker positions maintain the 
core commitments of the Received View; they accept the existence 
of a distinct personal level, the utility of a great amount of personal-
level explanation, and the role of personal-level commitments as 
constraints on the cognitive-scientific enterprise. Once, however, 
we have set aside the Received View, we can query cognitive sci-
ence directly: “Is there something self-like in cognitive-scientific 
models?” Here I think the answer is probably ‘yes’, a matter I return 
to in the closing section. 
4. To reiterate, then, I do not claim that the sorts of states 
associateed with the personal level—beliefs, desires, 
consciously experienced visual percepts—do not exist or 
that cognitive science eliminates them. Rather, my point 
is that if such states exist, we should expect to find them 
at the same level as mechanical, so-called subpersonal 
cognitive processing. I acknowledge the pos-sibility that 
a substantive personal-subpersonal distinction might 
emerge from cognitive science itself; but, regarding this 
possibility, I think the data speak against it at this point. 
Normative properties, for example, appear to do no work 
in extant models in cognitive science (cf. Drayson 2012) 
(though, to be clear, subjects’ mental representations of 
normative properties do appear in extant mod-els—
Klucharev et al. 2009, Klucharev et al. 2011). Cognitive-
scientific models of conscious state do not place them at 
a distinctive level; the global workspace appears in 
models of consci-ousness right alongside the 
nonconscious processing sensory input (Dehaene, 
Changeux, and Naccache 2011). Thus, rejecting the 
existence of a personal level (or rejecting the scientific 
utility of personal-level explanation) does not entail the 
rejection of beliefs, desires, etc. The two issues are 
orthogonal—unless one holds the implaus-ible position 
that appearing at a higher ontological level from the level 
of, say, a computationally modeled language parser is a 
neces-sary condition on something’s being a belief, 
desire, conscious state, etc.Empirical Support and 
Illustration 
This section describes empirical work that illustrates and reinforces 
both the negative and the positive messages of Section 3. To be 
clear, these messages are as follows: 
Negative Messages. Cognitive science does not 
provide evidence of the existence of a distinctive 
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personal level and does not presuppose the exist-
ence of such a level as a structuring principle; thus, 
the Received View of the relation between cogni-
tive science and questions in philosophy of mind 
should be rejected, and empirically oriented philo-
sophers of mind should not expect to find the hu-
man self at the personal level; 
 
Positive Messages. Cognitive science deals in the mod-
eling of objectively measured, replicable data; the 
relevant modeling practices leave room for the 
appearance of such states as belief, desire, and con-
scious experience alongside mechanisms, states, 
and processes normally associated with the sub-
personal level;5 cognitive science also leaves room 
for the appearance of a substantive personal-
subpersonal distinction (though, as indicated in 
Negative Messages, it seems unlikely, in fact, to ap-
pear). 
Let us look now in some detail at a paper by Lau, Rogers, and 
Passingham (2007), entitled “Manipulating the Experienced Onset 
of Intention after Action Execution.” I focus on this paper for 
various reasons. The experiments to be discussed are of inherent 
interest and perhaps of particular interest to philosophers thinking 
about free will, action, and responsibility. Reader be forewarned, 
however. This inherent interest introduces a potential distraction. 
I do not represent these results as definitive and warn against the 
thought that my argument somehow rests on such a claim. Thus, 
two further reasons take pride of place. First, the kind of modeling 
that shows up in this paper manifests the norm in cognitive science. 
There is nothing idiosyncratic or off-beat about it. It is entirely 
representative, specifically with regard to the claims I make about 
the role of the personal level in cognitive-scientific modeling. 
Second, the article’s title is chock full of philosophically loaded 
words: ‘experience’, ‘intention’, and ‘action’. Experiences are 
normally taken to be conscious. Actions are normally taken to be 
5 Compare Gendler, “But alongside that belief there is something else going on” 
(2008, 635; and similar language is repeated on 636 and on 637), where that 
something else is what would normally be labeled ‘subpersonal processing’, al-
though Gendler herself does not use the terms ‘personal’ and ‘subpersonal’. 
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the expression of rationality, issuing from the subject’s desires and 
beliefs that have combined to cause the formation of an intention 
to act. If one were ever to find a paper in cognitive science that 
incorporates, or is structured by commitments regarding, the 
personal-level, this paper would seem to be it. Nevertheless, the 
most parsimonious, least convoluted way of understanding Lau et 
al.’s model—that is, a straightforward reading of the model—
reveals interaction between various same-level subpersonal states 
that produce the data collected, with personal-level states playing 
no role. 
To frame the study, consider the possibility that one’s 
conscious experience of forming an intention to act occurs after 
the neural processes that initiate the action in question. Experi-
mental evidence of such a situation would be striking, for it would 
appear to show that one’s conscious mind is not controlling action, 
contrary to intuitive reports, at least in some cases (Libet et al. 1983, 
Libet 1985).  
It is, however, notoriously difficult to record absolute timing 
of the kind of events in question (see Dennett 2003 for a discussion 
of some of the complications). Thus, Lau et al. design experiments 
that probe only relative timing. The thought is that if a subject’s 
report of the timing of his or her conscious intention to act can be 
manipulated by a neural intervention at the time of, or shortly after, 
the execution of the action, then that intention would not seem to 
be fully formed until the time of, or even after, the execution of the 
action. After all, if it had been fully formed and operative in the 
production of the behavior, why would the subject’s estimate of 
the time of occurrence of the intention change as the result of 
events that happen after the cause of the action? 
Let us look more closely at the design of Lau et al.’s main 
experiment. Subjects rest their heads on a support and look at a 
timing display of the type shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The timing device used by Lau, Rogers, and Passingham. Subjects 
attend to the face of the clock during the experiment. At the beginning of each 
trial, the dot moves from its center position to the perimeter and begins circl- 
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The subjects fixate on the dot in the middle of this fine-grained 
timing device, which begins in the center and then moves around 
the marked area on the circumference of the clock (with a total 
period of about 2.5 seconds). The relevant experimental events 
occur while the dot is moving. The subject is meant to index those 
events to the time of their occurrence, by reference to the clock. 
The subject does so by controlling a cursor with her or his right 
hand. The dot moves back to the center after the experimental 
events, and the subject grabs it with the cursor and moves it to the 
position that indicates the timing of the event about which the 
subject is being queried. 
What are the events? The subject is told to press a button with 
her or his left index finger, at whim. Then, depending on the trial, 
the subject is asked to use the cursor to indicate either the time at 
which the conscious intention to move was formed or the time at 
which the action itself (the left index finger’s pressing of the 
button) occurred. Lau et al. introduce four manipulations. They 
apply transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS—which in essence 
scrambles the information encoded in whatever bit of cortex is 
targeted by the disturbance in the magnetic field caused by TMS), 
either at the exact time of or 200 ms after the action has been 
executed; or, they apply sham TMS (indistinguishable to the sub-
jects from genuine TMS, except that no magnetic field is generated) 
at one of the two intervals in question. The actual TMS pulses 
target pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), the part of the 
brain in which a wave of activity (the readiness potential) begins to 
build up prior to motor output. 
Recall the logic of the experiment. If the subject had formed a 
conscious intention to move his or her left index finger, which then 
caused that action to happen, and, say, 200 milliseconds after the 
action, someone scrambled part of the subject’s pre-SMA, the sub-
ject’s report of the timing of the intention should not be shifted in 
time; such scrambling should be irrelevant. But, the results seem to 
-ing clockwise, in the manner of a second hand sweeping round a clock face. At 
the end of each trial, the dot returns to its center position. The subject must 
then drag the dot, using a cursor in the subject’s right hand, to the position on 
perimeter where the dot was at the time of the relevant experimental event (for 
example, when the subject first experienced a conscious intention to move his 
or her left index finger). Reprinted from Hakwan C. Lau, Robert D. Rogers, and 
Richard E. Passingham, “Manipulating the Experienced Onset of Intention after 
Action Execution,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19:1 (January, 2007), pp. 81–
90. 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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conflict with that picture of the process. There is a main effect of 
genuine TMS v. sham TMS in both the case of reports of the timing 
of the intention to act and reports of the time of the action itself. 
(In each case—report of timing of action or report of timing of 
intention—there was no significant difference between the effect 
of administering TMS versus sham TMS at the time of the action 
or 200 ms after the action.) Moreover, the reported timing of the 
intention is on average shifted in one direction when subjects were 
queried about the time of action and in the other direction when 
subjects were queried about the time of the formation of the 
conscious intention to act. The reported timing of the intention 
was on average nine milliseconds or sixteen milliseconds earlier 
depending on whether the TMS was given a zero delay or 200-
millisecond delay. The reported timing of the movement was either 
fourteen or nine milliseconds later in the TMS condition than in 
the sham TMS condition depending on whether it was a zero delay 
or 200-millisecond delay. This difference in the direction of the 
shift creates something of a puzzle. Why would TMS push the 
report of the timing of the intention to act in one temporal 
direction and the timing of the report of the actual movement in 
the other direction? 
The results themselves are of interest, but what’s more import-
ant for present purposes is Lau et al.’s proposed model of this 
peculiar aspect of the results. That model employs Bayesian cue 
integration. Technical details aside, the basic idea is that part of the 
brain is responsible for estimating the timing of events and does so 
by integrating signals arriving from various other parts of the brain 
during a temporally extended period or arriving from the same 
parts of the brain at different times in the relevant temporal 
window. And, each of those signals (that is, cues) is treated as 
having a different degree of reliability; it has a noise term associated 
with it that indicates, for example, the probability that the signal 
arriving from that source is not accurate. The part of the brain 
responsible for determining such timing can then cause motor 
output, in this case, the dragging of the mouse to a particular point 
indicating the estimated timing of the event in question.  
A useful analogy is to one’s asking a collection of different 
witnesses (or the same witness at different times) for testimony and 
then balancing the various reports against each other. Each witness 
will be treated as having a certain degree of reliability, which will be 
a factor in determining the best overall story to construct. In Lau 
et al.’s model, the degrees of noise associated with each of the 
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different sources of information arriving at different times are 
analogous to levels of reliability assigned to various witnesses’ 
reports. 
Now consider the effect of TMS. Essentially, it reduces the 
reliability of the information in the area that has been hit with the 
electromagnetic pulse. That area of the brain has its information 
scrambled, so to speak, by complete polarization. As a result, the 
part of the brain estimating timing treats the signal coming from 
the scrambled part of the brain as less reliable relative to the other 
“witnesses” and discounts the information accordingly.  
In all of the trials in Lau et al.’s main experiment TMS targets 
the same area, pre-SMA, but depending on what judgment is being 
made—the timing of the conscious intention to move or the timing 
of the movement itself—the contribution of the pre-SMA at the 
time of scrambling holds a different temporal position in the series 
of cues arriving in the part of the brain that estimates timing. When 
estimating the timing of the intention, events in the pre-SMA at the 
time of action or 200 ms after the action hold a late position among 
the “witnesses.” Compare it, for instance, to the activity of pre-
SMA, say, 200 ms prior to action, which will also make a significant 
contribution to the estimation of timing of the conscious attention, 
but that activity will be an “early” contributor. Thus, in the case of 
the timing of the intention, a late source of information is being 
discounted, with the effect that earlier sources are given more 
weight. Assuming that the part of the brain estimating timing uses 
the temporal order of the arrival of information as itself an image 
of the timing of events relevant to the calculation of the timing of 
the intention, the effect in the case of the estimation of the timing 
of the intention is to move it earlier in time toward the more heavily 
weighted earlier signals. The later witnesses—which given their 
very arrival time contribute cues that the event happened later—
are being written off as unreliable. Thus, the reported timing of the 
intention is earlier in TMS condition versus the sham-TMS condi-
tion. Again, the estimated timing of the intention is a function of 
earlier and later activity in motor cortex. If you introduce noise into 
the later activity, it is discounted and earlier activity gets more 
weight. Earlier reporting witnesses are trusted more. That moves 
the report of the conscious intention earlier in time. 
In contrast, TMS shifted the report of the action itself in the 
other direction, that is, significantly later in time compared to the 
reported timing of the action in the sham-TMS condition. Why? 
According to Lau et al.’s proposed model, it is because the report 
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of the action itself is based on a different set of “witnesses,” a 
different set of signals, within a different, and later, temporal win-
dow. The report of the action itself is a function of later activity in 
motor cortex together with confirmation of the executed action by 
proprioception and vision. Compare: When one thinks one has 
raised one’s arm, that thought is partly confirmed by the proprio-
ceptive information of one’s arm being at a different location as 
well as one’s seeing it in a different position, out of the corner of 
one’s eye; these sources are in addition to information coming from 
the cortical source of the outgoing motor command to raise one’s 
arm and kinesthetic information arriving internally from the nerv-
ous system indicating motion. In the experimental context, TMS 
on pre-SMA at the time of the action or 200 ms after introduces 
noise early in the temporal series of these sources of information, 
that is, earlier than such sources as visual and proprioceptive feed-
back. Given that the earlier “witnesses” are being discounted, the 
later ones—proprioception, for example—carry more weight than 
they normally would relative to the earlier ones. So, the part of the 
brain estimating the timing of the action assigns a later time stamp. 
So far, personal-level properties and states make no appearance 
in the model. But, might one think of the behavioral report of 
timing as the output of personal-level process, that is, as a personal-
level action. One could then tell a complex story about how 
supposed personal-level states—paying attention, being conscious 
of the instructions—interact with sub-personal level states—the 
ones appearing in Lau et al.’s model—to produce a personal-level 
action. That is a possible interpretation, but why bother? From the 
standpoint of the model, such a gloss is entirely gratuitous. It’s not 
metaphysics being read off of the science; that would be one thing, 
and something worth attempting to do. Instead, it is superfluous 
metaphysics added to the model. After all, personal-level states 
don’t appear in the model, and the elements of the model don’t 
neatly fall into two categories that could plausibly be thought to 
mark a division between the personal and subpersonal. The model 
reveals only a collection of same-level states interacting to produce 
the data. The states that control motor report are part of a set of 
states that interact in complex ways with each other, some of those 
states assign degrees of uncertainty, some of them construct a mod-
el of temporal relations, some of them constitute the readiness 
potential, some produce finger movements, all at a single subper-
sonal level, and so on. That’s all that the model contains. 
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One might object that the subpersonal states included in the 
model make sense only against the assumed backdrop of such 
personal-level states as the subject’s paying attention and under-
standing the experimenter’s instructions. But, the question to be 
asked in response is whether the cognitive-scientific models of 
those processes—of paying attention or understanding instruct-
tions—invoke personal-level states. And, I submit that, in the 
relevant respects, such models are no different from the model 
already considered. Although Lau et al. do not themselves address 
the question of motor control of the cursor, they do make 
preliminary remarks about attention, providing evidence that 
they’ve correctly identified the fronto-parietal networks that 
constitute the attentional system that tracks activity in pre-SMA; 
such a model, based on activity in fronto-parietal circuits, does not 
include personal-level constructs. On this view, background 
assumptions about personal-level states and processes are likely to 
serve only as useful ladders in cognitive science, to be kicked away 
when models of those very processes are developed. 
Let us now consider a second case, more briefly, that of the 
interaction of implicit and explicit states and their co-contribution 
to the production of behavior. There is a growing literature on the 
behavioral effects of what are often called ‘implicit attitudes’ 
(attitudes, because they have an evaluative dimension), with 
particular interest in socially relevant implicit bias, for example, bias 
in hiring. One widely discussed kind of case is that in which a 
subject professes egalitarian attitudes about race but, when asked 
to make snap judgments in an experimental context, seems to show 
bias against members of a racial “out-group” (see Brownstein and 
Saul 2016, vols 1 and 2). 
A well-known version of this kind of experiment explores racial 
attitudes in the United States, typically involving white and blacks. 
In these experiments, subjects (both white, and to some degree, 
black subjects) seem to display racial bias against blacks on the 
implicit attitude test (IAT), even when the subjects avow egalitarian 
attitudes. In this version of the IAT, a monitor displays, serially, a 
mixture of positively valenced words, negatively valenced words, 
images of stereotypically black faces, and images of stereotypically 
white faces. Subjects are told to sort the images into two disjunctive 
categories, as quickly as they can. In one condition, the categories 
are “black-or-good” and “white-or-bad”; in a contrasting 
condition, the categories are “black-or-bad” and “white-or-good.” 
The subjects sort the stimuli by pressing a button on the left or a 
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button on the right, one assigned to each disjunctive category. They 
find the cate-gorization process more difficult in former case than 
in the latter. Their reaction times are significantly slower when one 
of the cate-gories combines black and good than when the category 
in question combines black and bad. In other words, the subjects 
seem to find it easier to fit negative words, as opposed to positive 
words, into the same category as black faces in a situation in which 
they must react quickly, without reflection or deliberation. The 
thought, then, is that subjects—even those who profess egalitarian 
attitudes—have negative implicit attitudes toward blacks. And, of 
great concern is that such negative implicit attitudes might be 
driving social interactions, from the creation of unhealthy 
conversational dynamics to the ways in which hiring committees 
make snap-decisions about the degree of promise a given résumé 
manifests (when, for example, it has a stereotypically black name 
associated with it as opposed to a stereotypically white name). 
This conveys a sense of why the research on implicit attitudes 
is of such importance and has received so much attention. That 
being said, experiments involving race are part of a much larger 
research program investigating the role of implicit states, partly as 
a way of constructing a more accurate picture of human cognitive 
architecture. (Some of this literature is connected to the more gen-
eral exploration of the distinction between System 1 processing and 
System 2 processing—see Evans and Frankish 2009.) Thus, one 
finds in the literature experimental results on other topics, such as 
cigarette smoking and junk food. Take a subject who claims to 
prefer healthy snacks over sugary snacks but who shows a 
preference for sugary snacks on an IAT, where the disjunctive 
categories into which stimuli are to be quickly sorted are, for 
example, “sugary-snacks-or-pleasant” and “fruit-or-unpleasant” 
(and vice versa, on other trials). Imagine that at the end of the 
session, as the subject is leaving, the experimenter gives the subject 
the opportunity to choose one item from a collection of snack 
foods and fruit as part of his or her compensation for participating 
in the experiment. Is a subject who shows a more positive attitude 
toward sugary snacks on the IAT more likely to choose a sugary 
snack over fruit, even if the subject avows a preference for healthy 
snacks? The answer would seem to be ‘yes’ (Perugini 2005). It is 
tempting to think of the architecture-related message of much of 
this work as follows: explicit attitudes, those that subjects report, 
are personal-level states, while implicit attitudes, those that drive 
fast, automatic, nondeliberative responses, are subpersonal states.  
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But, that would, I think, be to jump to an unwarranted 
conclusion. According Perugini, “The key message is that implicit 
and explicit attitudes can interact in influencing behavior” (Perugini 
2005, 41), in some cases modulating the effects of the each other. 
Assume Perugini is correct. Still, his claim does not itself rule out 
the possibility that such interactions criss-cross ontological levels. 
Yet, although that possibility is left open, that’s not the natural way 
to read Perugini’s statistical model (see Figure 2).  
  
Here we see a model that makes no use of an ontological 
distinction between a personal and a subpersonal level. There are 
explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, each of which can contri-
bute to the production of either kind of behavior: deliberative 
(normally associated with explicit attitudes) or spontaneous (norm-
ally associated with implicit attitudes). And, each of the two kinds 
of attitudes can modulate the contribution of the other.6 No 
6 The italics in Figure 2 indicate that the values for interactive connections—
those running between implicit and explicit attitudes—are nonsignificant. But, 
the analogous interactive terms take on significant values in the analysis of a 
structurally analogous experiment reported earlier in the same paper (an experi-
ment on attitudes toward smoking and smoking behavior). Perugini gives no 
indication that he conceives any differently of the model of the factors relevant 
Figure 2. A graphical representation of various factors contributing to the 
production of deliberative or spontaneous behavior. Reprinted from Perugini, 
Marco. 2005. “Predictive Models of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology 44: 29–45.  2005, The British Psychological Society. 
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element in the model corresponds to a distinctively personal level. 
There are only explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, on the same 
level, correlated with results on various measures (IAT’s and ques-
tionnaires), and interacting and co-contributing the production of 
spontaneous behavior and interacting and co-contributing to the 
production of deliberative behavior. 
Perugini’s conception of the architecture is not idiosyncratic. 
Bertram Gawronski and Galen Bodenhausen are leading figures in 
the field of implicit attitudes research and are the progenitors of 
the associative-propositional evaluative (APE) model of implicit 
attitudes. In a relatively recent paper, they say, “By making specific 
assumptions about mutual interactions between associative and 
propositional processes, the APE model implies a wide range of 
predictions about the conditions under which implicit and explicit 
evaluations show either converging or diverging patterns of re-
sponses” (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2014, 188–189). This 
echoes the interactive view advocated for by Perugini, but in place 
of implicit attitudes, they talk about associative processes, and in 
place of explicit attitudes they put propositional processes, and in 
place of spontaneous behavior and deliberative behavior, they talk 
of implicit and explicit evaluations.7 
What’s the moral of the story, then, concerning cognitive 
architecture? One might claim that psychology is flat (as was 
claimed in Rupert 2015). That might be a bit of an overstatement. 
Perhaps some neural states implement other neural processes such 
that the subpersonal level itself subdivides into many levels 
(Churchland and Sejnowski 1992, Craver 2007). Nevertheless, 
psychology is, as one might say, “flattened from above.” There is 
no distinct personal level that provides an external constraint on, 
by setting external standards of success for, cognitive science. On 
the “flattened from above” view, one is free to identify explicit 
attitudes with a distinctive kind of state, the kind of state that 
produces reflective verbal report, for example. But, the process of 
producing that verbal report appears side-by-side (as it were), not 
to the results in the first case, even though that analysis is presented only 
discursively. 
7 They do so because they’re inclined to think that there is only one underlying 
representation, but different ways of processing it, depending on the probe being 
used. If they are right about this, it would seem only to reinforce the negative 
point made in the main text, that an ontologically distinct personal level plays no 
role in the architecture.  
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above, many of what are typically identified as subpersonal states 
and processes.  
5. In Search of the Cognitive-Scientific Self 
Here is a different way to approach the idea of a flat psychology 
(or at least one flattened from above) that may help us to identify 
the cognitive-scientific self. Consider the distinguishing character-
istics of various cognitive subsystems: the domain of application, 
typically understood as the kind of content the subsystem’s repre-
sentations carry, as well as the subsystem’s contribution to the 
production of characteristic output (typically directed toward the 
objects, properties, or kinds in the domain in question). A face 
recognition subsystem is a face recognition system partly because 
it represents faces, and then allows access to that information in 
behavioral control, say, in the production of names that refer to 
individuals with the faces in question. A language parser is a lang-
uage parser because it represents the syntactic structure and 
semantic content of incoming linguistic strings and it contributes 
to the control of, for example, verbal output when reading aloud. 
And so on, for visual processing, spatial navigation, and a variety 
of other subsystems that are normally placed at the subpersonal 
level. Nothing in my preceding arguments rules out the existence 
of one or more subsystems, appearing at the same level as these 
others, that is oriented toward what are typically thought of as 
personal-level phenomena (cf. the view taken in Drayson 2012 
toward supposed personal-level states). One such subsystem may 
well contain information about the standing commitments of the 
very organism containing that subsystem.  
Thus, we might identify the cognitive-scientific self with the 
subsystem responsible for encoding information—a biographical 
narrative, for example—particularly relevant to what is pretheoret-
ically identified with the personal level. Dan Dennett has called this 
sort of construct the ‘public relations department’, because of its 
distinctive contribution to our explicit presentation of ourselves to 
conspecifics: “In fact, we wouldn’t exist, as Selves ‘inhabiting 
complicated machinery’ as Wegner vividly puts it, if it weren’t for 
the evolution of social interactions requiring each human animal to 
create within itself a subsystem designed for interacting with 
others” (Dennett 2003, 47). On this view, the self is a subsystem 
that manages interaction with others by providing socially felicitous 
reasons for our actions when queried, regardless of whether these 
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accurately map onto the actual causes of our actions. But, 
Dennett’s view is more expansive: “Wegner is right, then, to 
identify the Self that emerges in Libet’s and his experiments as a 
sort of public-relations agent, a spokesperson instead of a boss, but 
these are extreme cases set up to isolate factors that are normally 
integrated, and we need not identify ourselves so closely with such a 
temporally isolated self” (ibid., 48–49). And, Dennett goes on to 
describe ways in which this subsystem can also help to integrate 
one’s own action over time, by keeping track of one’s recently made 
decisions and the like. I agree that cognitive science is likely to yield 
a more expansive understanding of a self-representing, self-
narrating subsystem. I say more presently about further functions 
of that representation presently. But, first, it’s worth flagging a 
point of potential conflict. Although cognitive science may well 
detail many fruitful uses of a self-representation, cognitive science 
may yield a fruitful notion of a self as the cognitive system as a 
whole (Rupert 2009). In closing, I return to this possibility. 
Assume there is one or more cognitive subsystems that encode 
and transform information to do with one’s biography, experi-
ences, recent decisions, etc. This may well come into play, as 
Dennett suggests, when we construct explanations of our behavior, 
to be offered to others. “I chose music school because I’ve loved 
music all my life,” one might say when asked about one’s enroll-
ment in a music training program. This might or might not repre-
sent the decision-making process accurately; the person in question 
might actually have chosen to go to music school because, say, 
other motivation-oriented subsystems associate being a musician with 
being attractive to potential partners.  
A standing representation8 of one’s own commitments, 
history, personality traits, and experience is likely to be useful for a 
variety of other purposes, however. For example, a self-
representation may facilitate the search for and evaluation of 
options during decision-making. Exhaustive search is 
computationally or other-wise resource intensive. There’s little 
reason to think humans engage in it, given limitations on the brain’s 
computational power. Even systems with computational power far 
8 I use the term ‘standing’ quite loosely. The reconstructive nature of memory 
suggests that this information will itself be somewhat fluid. For example, the 
details and framing of one’s life story may change somewhat from telling to 
telling—or, more generally, from instance of cognitive use to instance of cogni-
tive use—without conscious awareness of such variation. 
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beyond a human’s face search problems of the sort solved by 
computer scientists only by the use of heuristics (Russell and 
Norvig 2011). One commonly proposed way for humans to make 
decisions manageably is by satisficing, rather than optimizing 
(Simon 1956), that is, by hitting upon an option that is “good 
enough” rather than optimal. What, though, will count as good 
enough? Here one might find a role for the self-representation: an 
option that has made its way to the front of the queue might well 
be deemed “good enough,” and thus selected, because of its 
sufficient degree of fit with one’s self-representation. And, 
returning to the example of the preceding paragraph, this may be 
true even if other motivational states primed certain possible 
actions for consideration early in the search pro-cess; it might be 
that once music school was considered, it was chosen because of 
the high degree to which it meshes with one’s personal narrative, 
even if a desire to be attractive to potential romantic partners, 
together with states automatically associated with that desire (say, 
images of musicians being treated as cool and desirable), caused the 
“music school” option to be pushed forward for consideration 
early in the process. 
The availability of information—options or otherwise—might 
also be affected by one’s self-conception. Which possibilities or 
facts “come to mind” in a given situation is determined by associa-
tive processing not available to consciousness. And, what drives 
these comings-to-mind may well, as much as anything, be degrees 
of associative strength between the representations in the subject’s 
self-narrative and the information or possible actions in question. 
And, while this might have negative effects, such as confirmation 
bias, it might also serve to entrench further the contents of the self-
representation, and thus enhance the positive effects of possessing 
a relatively stable self-representation. 
Consider too the potential role a self-representation might play 
in the production of less deliberate action. Our more automatized 
actions—those taken while walking, driving, or holding a fluid, 
real-time conversation—may well have their course influenced by 
our standing representation of ourselves. In the case of walking, 
one’s self-representation may help to determine gait; in driving, 
one’s self-conception might affect how aggressively or cautiously 
one changes lanes; and in the case of conversation, how readily one 
makes critical remarks might be determined partly by one’s self-
representation. 
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This raises our final set of questions, however. Is there a well-
demarcated portion of the cognitive system—the portion that 
keeps (or quickly reconstructs in context) a running biography—
that should be thought of as the self? And, if so, should the self be 
identified with the mechanistic, neural, or computational portion 
of that system? Or, should the self be identified, rather, with the 
content of the representations in that system? Of course, further 
options move to the fore if the narrative-keeping subsystem is not 
well demarcated. The most obvious alternative perhaps is the entire 
cognitive system (the entire organism being another). 
I tentatively opt for the cognitive system as a whole, while 
recognizing the fruitful purposes served by various processes that 
manage and deploy a record or a narrative concerning the organ-
ism’s history, commitments, etc. My reasoning rests partly on the 
mutability of the contribution of such portions of the cognitive 
system (that is, on a concern that there is no discrete subsystem of 
the sort Dennett describes in the first quotation above), but even 
more so on the extent to which they collaborate and co-contribute, 
alongside other structures and subsystems at the same level, to the 
production of various forms of behavior that we treat as actions of 
the person. Beyond the sorts of examples given above, I have in 
mind such cases as that of the co-contribution of the body schema 
and the body image to the production of behavior (see Gallagher 
2005 for a discussion of this distinction and the extent to which the 
operations of the body schema—normally thought to be part of 
the subpersonal cognitive system—suffuse the workings and out-
puts of consciousness—normally associated with personal-level 
phenomena). 
What, then, is the cognitive system as a whole? As I see things 
(Rupert 2009, Rupert 2010), the cognitive system is an integrated 
collection of mechanisms that, in overlapping subsets, contributes 
to the production of a wide range of forms of intelligent behavior. 
What is intelligent behavior? Just as in any science, we must identify 
this, in the first instance, by example, that is, by pointing to various 
phenomena that we think are of a piece. Such examples might 
include engaging in conversation, giving correct answers on reading 
comprehension tests, creating line-drawings that guide the con-
struction of a building having the same structure as the drawings, 
creating experimental apparatuses, giving lectures, writing books, 
playing complex games, and creating sculptures. In the architect-
ural case, we observe behavior that’s striking in its complexity and 
coordination. An architect makes line drawings. A general contract-
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or carries those drawings away and subsequently contacts sub-
contractors, who contact laborers and suppliers, and so on. And, 
eventually, there comes into existence a large physical structure 
with the same form as the original drawings. This is incredibly 
impressive and cries out for explanation, as do a wide range of 
other forms of behavior that seem, broadly speaking, intelligent. 
Cognitive science bets that empirical investigation will yield a 
relatively unified set of models of at least most of these forms of 
behavior.9 
What is built into the idea of overlapping subsets? The thought 
is that the human cognitive system contains various relatively spe-
cialized mechanisms each of which can contribute to the perform-
ance of a variety of tasks (see Anderson 2010, 2014, for a specific 
view about how the brain might support this arrangement). Take, 
for instance, a mechanism that identifies geometrical shapes (per-
haps this appears in the word form area WF). It might contribute 
along with one set of mechanisms to the production of perform-
ance in reading aloud. It might contribute alongside a largely dis-
joint set of mechanisms in the solution of problems in geometry. 
It might contribute alongside yet another set of mechanisms while 
cleaning house. The idea, then, is that for any mechanism that is 
properly a part of the cognitive system, it contributes to a wide 
range of forms of intelligent behavior and does so by contributing 
in these shifting subsets of mechanisms. High degrees of overlap 
in such contributions integrate the various mechanisms into a 
single cognitive system; it is in virtue of all of a set of mechanisms 
having high degrees of overlap that they collectively constitute a 
single cognitive system. 
How, on this view, should we think of subjects who profess 
egalitarian views about race but show conflicting results on the 
implicit attitude tests? Is such a person really racist or really egali-
tarian? The answer is “neither,” in the sense that neither of these 
kinds of response represents the subject’s true self. The true self is 
the entire collection of integrated mechanisms that produces var-
ious outputs under various circumstances. The subject is a person 
who produces these results when queried in a certain way and who 
produces other results when queried in a different way (cf. Dennett 
1991). This, I submit, is the cognitive-scientific self, derived from 
9 Relatively unified, if cognition or intelligence are, in fact, natural kinds, but that 
remains to be seen. 
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the science itself by noticing the important role that a cognitive 
architecture plays in cognitive-scientific modeling. It is not a ration-
ally coherent deliberator existing at a distinct level from cognitive-
scientific models. It is a collection of relatively integrated 
mechanisms co-contributing to the production of intelligent be-
havior, and, although there may be central tendencies in the 
responses it produces, it is nevertheless a somewhat loosely knit 
team, the dynamics of the operation of which deserve the attention 
they continue to receive from cognitive scientists. 
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